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DILUTION BY TARNISHMENT: AN 
UNWORKABLE CAUSE OF ACTION IN 
CASES OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION 
Abstract: This Note argues that the Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
(TDRA), enacted to provide relief to companies whose trademarks are 
used in tarnishing ways, is unworkable when applied to tarnishing uses in 
artistic works. When the TDRA was enacted in 2006, it included several 
amendments to current dilution law that will keep defendants who used a 
trademark in an expressive work free from liability no matter how tarnish-
ing the use. Specifically, the amendments require that the mark be nation-
ally famous and that the defendant’s use of the mark be a trademark use. 
They also include a noncommercial use exclusion as well as a broad and 
loosely interpreted fair use exclusion. These amendments unfairly tilt the 
TDRA in favor of artists who create works for some commercial purpose. 
Drawing from other areas of intellectual property, this Note suggests that 
there is a more appropriate standard that should be applied in the TDRA’s 
stead. In addition to not requiring a mark be nationally famous or that the 
tarnishing use be a trademark use, there should be a multi-factorial fair 
use defense similar to that of copyright law. This standard would more ap-
propriately balance First Amendment rights of artists with mark owners’ 
rights to preserve the reputation of their trademarks. 
Introduction 
 In July 2010, a controversy arose in Poland surrounding an ex-
tremely large poster, which depicted the work of artist Max Papeschi 
and  advertised an exhibition of his work at a local gallery.1 The poster 
combined Mickey Mouse’s image with a swastika and the body of a nude 
woman.2 The work was part of a larger series that portrayed iconic 
American cartoon figures with images of destruction.3 The contrast of 
the familiar Mickey Mouse trademark with images of nudity and Nazism 
appeared to tarnish the fun-loving and child-friendly reputation of Dis-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Eric Brothers, Naked Woman with Swastika Stirs Controversy in Poland, Suite 101 (Dec. 
3, 2010), http://www.suite101.com/content/max-papeschis-nazisexymouse-stirs-controversy-
in-poland-a316339; see also infra App. 
2 See Kirsten Grieshaber, Mickey Mouse with Nazi Symbol Causes Anger in Poland, Huffing-
ton Post ( July 14, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/14/mickey-mouse-with-
nazi-sy_n_645721.html; see also infra App. 
3 Grieshaber, supra note 2. 
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ney’s Mickey Mouse trademark.4 Nonetheless, the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act (TDRA) would fail to provide Disney any sort of protection 
should they decide to bring action against Max Papeschi under the 
TDRA.5 
 Trademark dilution doctrine seeks to protect the goodwill invest-
ment of mark holders by preventing the blurring or tarnishment of a 
trademark owner’s famous mark.6 When an artist portrays a mark nega-
tively, the public may associate the mark with the negative portrayal, 
thus damaging the mark’s reputation and selling power.7 This theory of 
dilution is called dilution by tarnishment.8 
 Relief under this theory, however, is limited when artists use a fa-
mous trademark in their expressive work.9 Although the mark holder 
may have a cause of action for dilution by tarnishment, tension exists 
between recognizing such an action and protecting First Amendment 
rights where the tarnishing use is in an expressive work.10 Despite the 
2006 passage of the TDRA, which made dilution by tarnishment a statu-
tory cause of action for mark holders,11 the Act’s current textual and 
analytical framework is favorable to artists.12 
 In response to the number of trademark and copyright infringe-
ment cases over the last ten years, and in the wake of the TDRA, schol-
arship has focused on ensuring adequate First Amendment protection 
for artists against infringement and dilution claims.13 This Note, how-
                                                                                                                      
 
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Grieshaber, supra note 2. 
5 See infra notes 202−286 and accompanying text. By referring to Papeschi’s work, I am 
simply providing a visual example of an artist’s tarnishing use of a trademark and am not 
implying that Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) applies extraterritorially. 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c); see Mary LaFrance, Understanding Trademark Law 204–07 
(2d ed. 2009) (providing a discussion on dilution theory); William Joern, Goodwill Harbor-
ing: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 Legitimates the Goodwill Investment in a Trade-
mark While Safeguarding the First Amendment, 17 DePaul-LCA J. Art & Ent. L. & Pol’y  267, 
302 (2007). 
7 See LaFrance, supra note 6, at 206–07; Sarah L. Burstein, Dilution by Tarnishment: The 
New Cause of Action, 98 Trademark Rep. 1189, 1191 (2008) (discussing trademark dilution 
and the definition of dilution by tarnishment). 
8 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
9 See infra notes 202−286 and accompanying text. 
10 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free Speech: 
Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 887, 898–99 
(2005). 
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). The Act amended the existing cause of action for dilution. 
See id. 
12 See infra notes 202−286 and accompanying text. 
13 See Joern, supra note 6, at 302 (praising the First Amendment protection the TDRA 
provides artists); Lee Ann W. Lockridge, When Is a Use in Commerce a Noncommercial Use?, 37 
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 337, 366 (2010) (recommending a broad interpretation of the TDRA’s 
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ever, seeks to push the debate in a new direction by suggesting that 
First Amendment protection in the trademark dilution context has 
been stretched too far, leaving corporations unable to attain even in-
junctive relief against diluters.14 Unlike the more tailored and flexible 
free speech doctrines found in the laws of trademark infringement, 
copyright, and right of publicity, dilution by tarnishment as constituted 
under the TDRA effectively prevents companies from prevailing against 
artists no matter how harmful the appropriation may be to the corpora-
tion’s mark.15 Papeschi, for example, would be free of liability despite 
the extremely unsavory association of the positive Disney brand with a 
swastika.16 
 Part I of this Note introduces trademark dilution and the codifica-
tion of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) into the Lanham 
Act.17 It also discusses the TDRA’s enactment and its amendments to 
the statutory cause of action for dilution in the Lanham Act and the 
resulting benefits to artists.18 It then compares and contrasts the TDRA 
exclusions with trademark infringement’s artistic relevance test.19 Part 
II follows this comparative analysis with one of copyright law and the 
balancing test courts use under the fair use doctrine.20 Part III similarly 
examines state right of publicity statutes and compares this area of law 
to dilution by tarnishment.21 Part IV analyzes the current deficiencies 
under the TDRA that allow artists to escape liability.22 Part V draws 
from the deficiencies of Part IV and looks to copyright law and the 
                                                                                                                      
noncommercial use exclusions to narrow the reach of dilution liability); Jeremy M. Roe, 
The Current State of Antidilution Law: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act and the Identical 
Mark Presumption, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 571, 571 (2008) (noting the positive effect of the 
TDRA’s expanded exemptions for fair use). 
14 See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 
61 Fla. L. Rev. 1011, 1011 (2009) (noting that trademark law permits negative depictions 
of marks). 
15 See id. at 1014 (highlighting that dilution laws will not address potential harm arising 
from negative depictions due to the ambiguity in the current law). Compare 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c) (containing a broad set of affirmative defenses that narrow the applicability of 
the TDRA), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (containing a four-factor fair use defense that does 
not automatically preclude claims against noncommercial uses), and 5 J. Thomas McCar-
thy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 28:41 (4th ed. 2010) (not-
ing a test some courts apply to right of publicity cases in which noncommercial uses are 
not immediately shielded from liability). 
16 See infra notes 323−328 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 24−56 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 57−131 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 132−138 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 139−173 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 174−201 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 202−286 and accompanying text. 
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right of publicity to suggest an alternative way in which trademark law 
could better serve the interests of intellectual property owners when 
faced with defendants who use the owners’ marks in expressive works.23 
I. Trademark Dilution by Tarnishment: The Clash of Artistic 
Expression and Trademark Owners’ Goodwill Investment  
Under the Current Statutory Framework 
 The Lanham Act, the federal statute of trademark law, prohibits 
trademark dilution, trademark infringement, and false advertising.24 
Trademark dilution became a prohibited activity under the Lanham 
Act with the 1995 codification of the FTDA.25 This Part examines the 
origins of trademark dilution and its statutory enactment under the 
Lanham Act.26 Section A defines dilution by tarnishment.27 Section B 
examines the codification of the FTDA and the case that ultimately led 
to its amendment through the TDRA in 2006.28 Section C analyzes the 
amendments that the TDRA made to dilution law, specifically those 
changes benefiting artists.29 Section D compares the broad TDRA ex-
clusions with trademark infringement’s more tailored artistic relevance 
test.30 
A. Origins of Trademark Dilution 
 Trademark dilution is the gradual corrosion of a trademark’s iden-
tity or reputation.31 There are two types of trademark dilution: blurring 
and tarnishment.32 Dilution by blurring occurs when the distinctive 
                                                                                                                      
23 See infra notes 287−338 and accompanying text. 
24 Trademark Act (Lanham Act) of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2006). 
25 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985, 985 (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c) (2006)). 
26 See infra notes 31−138 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 31−40 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 41−56 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 57−131 and accompanying text. 
30See infra notes 132−138 and accompanying text. 
31 See Siegrun D. Kane, Kane on Trademark Law: A Practitioner’s Guide § 9:1.1, 
(5th ed. 2010); Justin J. Gunnell, Evaluation of the Dilution-Parody Paradox in the Wake of the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 441, 446 (2008) (stat-
ing that dilution refers to an association that arises from a famous mark and a mark or 
trade name that either impairs the distinctiveness of the mark by blurring or harms its 
reputation by tarnishing). 
32 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). 
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identity of a mark is weakened through its use on dissimilar products.33 
Dilution by tarnishment refers to an unauthorized use of a mark that 
portrays the mark in an unwholesome context “likely to evoke unflat-
tering thoughts about the owner’s product,” thus tarnishing the good-
will investment in the mark.34 The primary purpose of dilution doc-
trine is to protect strong marks and the mark holder’s goodwill 
investment in those marks.35 Unlike trademark infringement where 
consumer confusion is the root of the problem, consumers in a dilu-
tion context remain able to identify the plaintiff’s product.36 The harm 
under tarnishment theory instead lies in the inability of consumers to 
positively identify the trademark.37 
                                                                                                                     
 Because it is rare that an artist’s use of a mark would impair the 
mark’s distinctiveness and it is more likely to cause reputational dam-
age to the mark, a mark holder would more likely bring an action 
against an artist under a tarnishment rather than a blurring theory.38 
Therefore, artists are unlikely targets in a dilution by blurring claim.39 
Rather than weaken the identity of the mark, an artist’s negative por-
trayal of the mark would simply tarnish the reputation of the source of 
the mark.40 
 
33 See Gunnell, supra note 31, at 446−47. In determining whether a mark will cause di-
lution by blurring, a court will consider six factors: (1) the degree of similarity between the 
mark or trade name and the famous mark, (2) the degree of inherent or acquired distinct-
iveness of the famous mark, (3) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is ex-
clusively using the mark, (4) the degree of the mark’s recognition, (5) whether the use of 
the mark was intended to create an association with the famous mark, and (6) any actual 
association between the mark and famous mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C); Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 
1339 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (quoting Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 
1994); Joern, supra note 6, at 273. This damaged reputation occurs through a defendant’s 
use of a mark similar to that of the mark holder in a way that creates an “undesirable, un-
wholesome, or unsavory mental association with the plaintiff’s mark.” See Original Appala-
chian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1039 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
35 See LaFrance, supra note 6, at 205. 
36 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002); H.R. Rep. No. 
104-374, at 2−3 (1995) (noting that unlike trademark infringement, dilution affects the 
public’s perception of a trademark without the presence of consumer confusion); Tara J. 
Goldsmith, What’s Wrong with This Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes with Artistic Expres-
sion, 7 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 821, 859 (1997). 
37 See Joern, supra note 6, at 273. 
38 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (ad-
dressing dilution by tarnishment rather than blurring). 
39 See Joern, supra note 6, at 285 (discussing dilution by blurring). 
40 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812. 
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B. Trademark Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
 Dilution law first developed through state statutes after Professor 
Frank Schechter, in an influential law review article, suggested expand-
ing unfair competition law to protect the uniqueness of a trademark.41 
After his article, states began enacting statutes addressing dilution, and 
eventually Congress passed the FTDA in 1995, amending the Lanham 
Act to recognize anti-dilution law at the federal level.42 Under the 
FTDA, a mark holder could obtain injunctive relief against a diluter if 
(1) the mark was famous, (2) the junior user made “commercial use in 
commerce of a mark or trade name,” (3) if the use began after the 
mark became famous, and (4) the use caused dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the mark.43 Congress provided three statutory exemptions: 
(1) fair use of a mark in comparative commercial advertising or promo-
tion to identify the competing goods or services, (2) noncommercial 
use, and (3) all forms of new reporting and news commentary.44 
 Notably, the FTDA, unlike its state law counterparts, did not ex-
plicitly include a cause of action for dilution by tarnishment.45 Despite 
this lack of an explicit statutory cause of action, however, some lower 
federal courts recognized the legitimacy of dilution by tarnishment 
claims under federal law.46 In addition to these courts’ acknowledging 
dilution by tarnishment, the FTDA’s legislative history shows Congress’s 
intent to protect famous trademarks from uses that may tarnish them.47 
 In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 
not only required a showing of actual dilution, but it also called into 
                                                                                                                      
41 See LaFrance, supra note 6, at 206 (discussing how the 1927 law review article rec-
ommended expanding trademark law beyond protecting against consumer confusion or 
deception); Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 
813, 825 (1927). 
42 See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 
985, 985 (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)). 
43 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Burstein, su-
pra note 7, at 1196 (listing the factors under the FTDA). The Act had defined dilution as 
the decreasing ability of a famous mark to “identify and distinguish goods or services, re-
gardless of the presence or absence of: (1) competition between the owner of the famous 
mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.” See 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
44 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)(3) (2006). 
45 See id. § 1125(c)(1). 
46 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812; MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 903 (recogniz-
ing both blurring and tarnishment). 
47 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812; MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 903; H.R. Rep. 
No. 104-374, at 2 (1995) (stating, however, that the “purpose of H.R. 1295 is to protect 
famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tar-
nish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion”). 
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question the existence of dilution by tarnishment as a cause of action 
under the FTDA.48 The Court cast a shadow over the FTDA when it 
required that mark holders show actual dilution to prevail on their dilu-
tion claims and then stated that dilution by tarnishment was not a fed-
eral cause of action.49 The case concerned a dilution action between 
Victoria’s Secret, a lingerie company, and Victor’s Little Secret, a small 
adult novelty store.50 Victoria’s Secret sought injunctive relief against 
the defendant’s use of “Victor’s Little Secret” as the store’s name.51 The 
Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s grant of an injunction, con-
cluding that the FTDA required a showing of actual dilution by objec-
tive proof of actual injury to the economic value of the mark.52 Under 
this actual dilution standard, the Court reasoned that Victoria’s Secret 
had insufficient evidence to prove actual dilution.53 
 In addition to holding that Victoria’s Secret failed to show actual 
dilution to the mark, the Court noted that tarnishment is not a specific 
cause of action under the FTDA.54 Whereas state anti-dilution statutes 
explicitly reference tarnishment, the Court reasoned, the FTDA’s statu-
tory text did not embrace tarnishment actions.55 In ruling so, the Court 
refused to give credit to the fact that the FTDA’s legislative history men-
tions tarnishment.56 
                                                                                                                      
48 See 537 U.S. 418, 432−33 (2003). 
49See id.; Roe, supra note 13, at 578–80. 
50 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 422. 
51 See id. The lower court granted the injunction, holding that Victoria’s Secret had 
produced sufficient evidence of a likelihood of dilution, and the appeals court affirmed. V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 
9, 2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
52 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432−33 (looking to the text of the FTDA, and holding that 
the “FTDA . . . provides that ‘the owner of a famous mark’ is entitled to injunctive relief 
against another person’s commercial use of a mark or trade name if that use ‘causes dilution 
of the distinctive quality’ of the famous mark” (emphasis added)); see also Joern, supra note 
6, at 279. 
53 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. The Court stated: 
Whether [tarnishment] is actually embraced by the statutory text, however, is 
another matter. Indeed, the contrast between the state statutes, which expressly 
refer to both “injury to business reputation” and to “dilution of the distinctive 
quality of a trade name or trademark,” and the federal statute which refers only 
to the latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA. 
Id.; see also Roe, supra note 13, at 579 (discussing the Moseley Court’s questioning of wheth-
er the FTDA included tarnishment as a cause of action). 
56 See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432; H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995). 
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C. Dilution by Tarnishment Under the TDRA: Effectively Providing  
Greater Protection for Artists 
 After the Supreme Court held that the FTDA required proof of 
actual dilution rather than a likelihood of dilution, Congress enacted 
the TDRA in 2006 to overrule Moseley and make clear that mark holders 
need only prove a likelihood of dilution.57 In passing the TDRA, Con-
gress also explicitly incorporated dilution by tarnishment in the statu-
tory text.58 A dilution action under the TDRA has three elements: (1) 
the famous mark must be distinctive, (2) another person must use a 
mark or trade name in commerce after the owner’s mark has become 
famous, (3) the use must be likely to cause dilution by blurring or tar-
nishment of the famous mark regardless of any confusion, competition, 
or actual economic injury.59 
 But the TDRA, by amending the Lanham Act and broadening the 
defenses, also undercut the benefits for mark holders.60 Thus although 
the TDRA was enacted to remedy the Moseley holding and make it eas-
ier for mark holders to show dilution, it also created greater loopholes 
through which artists could escape dilution liability.61 
1. Statutory Changes Favoring Mark Holders: Tarnishment and the 
“Likelihood Standard” 
 Through the TDRA, Congress made two key changes favorable to 
mark holders.62 First, Congress explicitly established dilution by tar-
nishment as a federal cause of action and defined the term specifi-
cally.63 Replacing the general definition of dilution from the FTDA, the 
TDRA defines dilution by tarnishment as the “association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that 
harms the reputation of the famous mark.”64 Unlike the FTDA’s gen-
eral definition of “dilution” —which focused on the capacity of a mark 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 Stat. 
1730, 1730–32 (2006) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)); Louis Vuitton Malletier 
S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007); Roe, supra note 13, 
at 580. 
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); Roe, supra note 13, at 581. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
60 See id. § 1125(c); Roe, supra note 13, at 580–88. 
61 See infra notes 62−131 and accompanying text. 
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Roe, supra note 13, at 581. 
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 3 (2005). 
64 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
2012] Dilution by Tarnishment and Artistic Expression 701 
to identify goods—the TDRA’s definition of dilution by tarnishment 
emphasizes the possibility of harm to the mark’s reputation.65 
 Second, responding to Moseley’s requirement of a showing of ac-
tual dilution, the TDRA extended the cause of action to any use of a 
mark that is “likely” to cause dilution by tarnishment.66 By only requir-
ing a likelihood of tarnishment rather than actual tarnishment, Con-
gress lowered the burden of proof on the trademark holder.67 The 
TDRA also creates a rebuttable presumption that a mark, identical or 
substantially similar to the original mark, is likely to tarnish the famous 
mark.68 Thus if an artist appropriates a mark, the burden is placed on 
the artist to show that there is no likelihood of tarnishment.69 The 
lower burden of proof for mark holders should give them a greater 
chance of winning dilution actions.70 
2. Changes in the Statutory Language That Favor Defendants 
 Nonetheless, the statutory changes which seemingly favor the mark 
owner are counterbalanced by other language in the TDRA that pro-
vides additional support to accused diluters, especially artists.71 Of 
these protections, the two most relevant are (1) the interpretation of 
the statute’s “use of a mark” language, which requires that the unau-
thorized use be a trademark use—that is, the defendant must use the 
mark as his own trademark rather than generally appropriating it in a 
distasteful manner—and (2) the requirement that the mark be nation-
ally famous.72 
                                                                                                                      
65 See id. 
66 See id. § 1125(c)(1). 
67 H.R. Rep No. 109-23, at 3, 5; see Moseley, 605 F.3d at 388; Ringling Bros.-Barnum & 
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 462 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that plaintiffs had to show actual economic loss), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(1); see also Roe, supra note 13, at 582 (stating other reasons for having a “likeli-
hood” standard, such as aligning with state antidilution laws, following the FTDA’s legisla-
tive history, and becoming more consistent with trademark infringement law, which re-
quires a likelihood standard for determining consumer confusion). 
68 See Moseley, 605 F.3d at 388–89. 
69 See id. (finding that the store Victor’s Secret could not overcome this presumption of 
tarnishment). 
70 See Roe, supra note 13, at 582. 
71 See id. at 585. 
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), (2)(A) (2006); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1216−24; Roe, 
supra note 13, at 585. 
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  Implicit in the statutory language is the requirement that the 
mark be used as a designation of source—that is, as a trademark.73 To 
be found liable for dilution by tarnishment, the accused use must be of 
“a mark or trade name.”74 In other words, an artist is only liable if he 
used a mark identical or similar to the holder’s mark as the artist’s own 
trademark.75 
 The second change wrought by the TDRA regards the fame of the 
mark.76 Despite strong recognition in a particular market, a mark own-
er cannot make a federal claim for dilution by tarnishment unless the 
mark is nationally famous.77 Congress limited the scope of dilution ac-
tions to nationally famous marks in two ways.78 First, the TDRA pro-
vides that a mark is famous only if it is “widely recognized by the gen-
eral consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of 
the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”79 This language was not in 
the FTDA.80 Second, the TDRA eliminates several factors that courts 
used under the FTDA to recognize niche market fame.81 Under the 
                                                                                                                      
 
73 See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1221. The statute provides injunctive relief to owners of 
famous marks whose marks are blurred or tarnished by another person who “commences 
use of a mark or trade name . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added); Burstein, supra 
note 7, at 1223 (noting that the Lanham Act defines “trade name” and “mark” to include 
an essential element that the mark be used to indicate the source of the goods or services); 
see also Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that the dilu-
tion claim failed because eBay did not use the Tiffany marks to refer to eBay’s own prod-
uct). Although this requirement is not an explicit change from the FTDA, post-TDRA 
courts have interpreted the language as a requirement, while before the enactment of the 
TDRA it was not regularly mentioned in cases. Compare Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 112 (requiring 
the use to be a trademark use), and Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 
F.3d 97, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (requiring the use to be a trademark use), with Walking Moun-
tain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812 (applying the FTDA to an artistic work not used as a trademark, 
and neglecting to discuss any requirement that the use of the Barbie mark be as the artist’s 
own trademark). 
74 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 265; Burstein, supra note 7, at 
1223 (noting that the Lanham Act defines “trade name” and “mark” to include an essen-
tial element that the mark be used to indicate the source of the goods or services). 
75 See 4 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 24:122. 
76 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
77 See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1217. 
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
79 Id. 
80 See id. § 1125(c). 
81 See id. § 1125(c)(2)(A). In determining whether a mark is famous, the Court now 
considers four factors: 
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of 
the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties. 
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales of goods or services 
offered under the mark. 
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FTDA there were eight factors used to determine the fame of a mark.82 
Although some courts required that a mark be nationally famous to 
receive protection, others looked to the fame factors, holding a mark 
famous if it was recognizable only in a niche market.83 This niche mar-
ket theory allowed mark holders with marks not recognized by the U.S. 
public at large to still qualify as sufficiently famous.84 With the TDRA’s 
requirement that the mark be widely recognized by the U.S. public and 
the elimination of several of the fame factors, mark holders with lesser 
known marks will have greater difficulty bringing dilution actions.85 In 
the 2008 case Board of Regents, University of Texas System ex rel. University of 
Texas at Austin v. KST Electric, Ltd., decided by the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Texas, the University of Texas sued for the mis-
use of its Longhorn logo.86 The court found that although the logo was 
part of a niche market, “[I]t was not at all clear whether someone who 
                                                                                                                      
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. 
(iv) Whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the 
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
Id. § 1125(c)(A)(i)−(iv). The TDRA eliminated four factors from the FTDA’s list of eight, 
including “channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used” and the 
“degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the 
marks’ owner,” in order to effectively eliminate the niche market theory. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(1)(E), (F) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006) (emphasis added). 
82 The eight factors used to determine the requisite fame of the mark were 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods 
or services with which the mark is used; 
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods and services with which the mark is 
used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels 
of trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunc-
tion is sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third par-
ties; and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the 
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)–(H) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv) (2006). 
83 See Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 
that plaintiff’s use of mark in a narrow market is sufficient to meet the requirement that a 
mark be famous); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1216. 
84 See Joern, supra note 6, at 283−84. 
85 See Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. System ex rel. Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. KST Elec., 
Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 675 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
86 See id. at 663. 
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was not a fan of college football would recognize the logo as being as-
sociated with the university.”87 
3. The Broadened Exclusions from Liability 
 The TDRA vastly expanded the defenses available to artists under 
the FTDA.88 Under the FTDA, there were three statutory exemptions: 
(1) fair use in comparative advertising or promotion to identify the 
competing goods or services, (2) news reporting and news commen-
tary, and (3) noncommerical use.89 The TDRA retained the latter two 
exceptions and significantly expanded the fair use exception.90 The fair 
use exception now provides for protection for “any fair use, including a 
nominative or descriptive fair use . . . including use in connection with 
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods 
or services; (ii) or identifying and parodying, criticizing, or comment-
ing upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the fa-
mous mark owner.”91 The TDRA thus expanded the narrow fair use in 
advertising to the much broader nominative and descriptive fair use in 
not only advertising but also in parodying, criticizing, or commenting 
upon the famous mark.92 This Section first discusses the retention of 
the noncommercial use exception.93 Then it addresses the expansion 
of the fair use exception to include nominative fair use and parody.94 
                                                                                                                      
 
87 See id. at 677 (holding that the mark was not sufficiently famous despite the fact that 
University of Texas football games are regularly nationally televised on ABC and ESPN with 
over thirty-five million viewers and the Longhorn silhouette logo is prominently featured 
as University of Texas’s logo during these broadcasts). 
88 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 
took great pains to ensure that trademark owners did not infringe upon free speech rights, 
winning broad exclusions in the TDRA under which artists can take cover. See Joern, supra 
note 6, at 292−94 (writing about the ACLU’s concern with safeguarding the First Amend-
ment from the TDRA). The ACLU believed that changing the requirement from a show-
ing of actual dilution to a likelihood standard could enable mark holders to impinge upon 
free speech rights. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 638 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 31–37 (2005) (statement of Mr. Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) 
[hereinafter TDRA Hearing]. 
89 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). 
90 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006). 
91 See id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i), (ii). 
92 See id. 
93 See infra notes 95−106 and accompanying text. 
94 See infra notes 107−131 and accompanying text. Before the inclusion of parody un-
der the TDRA’s fair use exception, courts had to fit parody under the noncommercial use 
exception. See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812 (finding that an artistic parody 
would be protected as a form of noncommercial expression, and as such, holding that the 
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 In retaining the exemption for noncommercial uses, Congress at-
tempted to balance the intellectual property rights of mark holders with 
the First Amendment right to free expression.95 Prior to the TDRA, the 
noncommercial use exception was defined by referring to the definition 
of commercial speech in First Amendment law.96 In 2002 in Mattel, Inc. 
v. MCA Records, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit differen-
tiated commercial from noncommercial speech by stating that if speech 
is “not ‘purely commercial’ —that is, if it does more than propose a 
commercial transaction—then it is entitled to full First Amendment 
protection.”97 Post-TDRA, courts have continued to look at the non-
commercial use exemption through the lens of commercial speech un-
der First Amendment case law.98 Thus even if a defendant’s use of a 
mark is “in commerce”99 as required by the TDRA, the noncommercial 
use exemption will release the defendant from liability, provided their 
primary purpose in using the mark was not commercial.100 
 With many contemporary artists striving for commercial success in 
the art market, the rigid interpretation of the noncommercial use de-
fense seems inapplicable to uses of trademarks in art.101 Under the cur-
rent statutory framework, a use will be shielded as noncommercial un-
less the use of the mark is inherently commercial.102 But in an art world 
that is increasingly commercial—with international art auctions gener-
ating billions of dollars in sales—the primary purpose of creating such 
                                                                                                                      
artist’s photographs subjecting Barbie to disturbing physical positions constituted non-
commercial speech). 
95 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906. 
96 See id; Lockridge, supra note 13, at 366. 
97 See 296 F.3d at 906 (emphasis added). 
98 See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339–40. 
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). The TDRA’s cause of action for injunctive relief 
now reads “the owner of a famous mark . . . shall be entitled to an injunction against an-
other person who . . . commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce . . . .” Id. (em-
phasis added). The “use in commerce” requirement is explained by the Lanham Act, 
which states that a mark is used in commerce on goods “when—(A) it is placed in any 
manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the 
tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement imprac-
ticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (B) the goods are 
sold or transported in commerce . . . .” Id. 
100 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906; Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339−40. 
101 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906; Roxbury Entm’t v. Penthouse Media Grp., Inc., 
669 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (noting that films are considered noncom-
mercial speech). 
102 See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. 
706 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:693 
works becomes unclear.103 Contemporary artworks have generated 
hundreds of millions in revenue via public auctions and commercial 
advertising in November 2011 alone.104 This commercial market is due 
in part to technological advances over the last several years—advances 
including online databases through which collectors worldwide can 
take part in multi-million dollar transactions, virtual art fairs, and real-
time online bidding.105 Nonetheless, in the context of trademarks, 
courts have not recognized the blurred line between commercial and 
noncommercial speech.106 
 In addition to the retention of the noncommercial use exception, 
the TDRA extended the Fair Use exception to include nominative fair 
use.107 Max Papeschi, as well as any other artist appropriating a famous 
mark, would easily be able to use nominative fair use as a defense to a 
potential dilution suit.108 Despite its inclusion in trademark dilution, 
nominative fair use was developed in the trademark infringement con-
text.109 In 1992, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in New 
Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., defined “nominative fair 
use” as a use of a mark that is permissible because the junior user uses 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Kelly Crow, New Buyers Bring Art Market Back to Glory, Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 2011, 
at B1 (reporting that Christie’s sold $5.25 billion worth of art in 2010 and Sotheby’s sold 
$4.3 billion in 2010). 
104 See Press Release, Sotheby’s, Sotheby’s Contemporary Art Evening Sale Totals Out-
standing $315,837,000 (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.sothebys.com/content/dam/sothebys/ 
PDFs/Contemporary-Evening-Nov11.pdf. The sale total for Sotheby’s November 2011 
Contemporary Art Evening Sale was $315,837,000. Id. 
105 See Eileen Kinsella, A Guide to the Virtual Art Market, ARTnews, Nov. 2010, at 99, 103 
(writing that the “instantaneous dissemination of information and images made possible 
by technology has had a major impact on the art world,” and that “today . . . artists create 
styles that they keep churning out, like a brand”). 
106 See Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 974 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007) (stating that Fox’s use of the Charwoman character is a form of noncommercial 
expression as it does more than propose a commercial transaction and is thus not subject 
to a dilution suit). 
107 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(3)(A) (2006). The fair use exception also includes descrip-
tive use in which a mark is used purely for its descriptive quality to describe one’s own 
product. 2 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 11:45. 
108 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 112; Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812. The nominative 
fair use defense may also prove unnecessary, provided courts continue to require that the 
contested use of a mark be a trademark use. See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 112; Burstein, supra note 
7, at 1225, 1244. If the junior user must use the mark as a trademark in order to fall within 
the scope of the statute, then the nominative fair use exception (which exempts non-
trademark uses) is irrelevant. See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1225, 1244 (noting the contradic-
tion between the trademark use requirement and the nominative fair use exception). 
109 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 
1992). In this case, a music group brought suit against newspapers for infringing upon the 
group’s trademark in polls on the group’s popularity. See id. at 302. 
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the mark in a non-confusing way for the purpose of identifying the 
mark holder’s goods or services.110 Nominative fair use thus excuses 
artists who use a trademark to describe or identify a mark holder’s 
product for purposes of criticism or reference.111 Papeschi clearly used 
the mark not to describe his own product, but to identify the Disney 
brand within his artwork.112 
 Dilution by tarnishment now shares this nominative fair use de-
fense with trademark infringement even though it does not share 
trademark infringement’s concern for likelihood of confusion.113 
                                                                                                                      
110 971 F.2d at 308. There is also the classic fair use defense, an affirmative defense in 
which the junior user asserts he is using the trademark in good faith in its descriptive sense 
to describe the junior user’s own product. 2 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 11:45 (“When the 
plaintiff chooses a mark with descriptive qualities, the fair use doctrine recognizes that ‘he 
cannot altogether exclude some kinds of competing uses, particularly those which use 
words in their primary descriptive and nontrademark sense.” (quoting U.S. Shoe Corp. v. 
Brown Grp., Inc., 740 F. Supp. 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 923 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 
1990))). 
111 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 809−10; Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 
F.3d 796, 801, 806 (9th Cir. 2002); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1242−43. Because the Lanham 
Act does not explicitly define nominative fair use and because courts deciding infringe-
ment cases have not all followed the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use test, it is unclear as 
to how courts in the dilution context will apply this defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) 
(2006); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1242−44 (discussing the confusion around how the 
courts will apply the test for nominative fair use as it stems from the infringement con-
text); see also New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. Trademark infringement’s three-part 
test for determining whether nominative use becomes nominative fair use is as follows: (1) 
plaintiff’s product or service in question must be one not readily identifiable without use 
of the trademark, (2) only so much of the mark can be used as necessary to identify the 
plaintiff’s product or service, and (3) the user must do nothing to suggest sponsorship or 
endorsement by the trademark holder. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. Nominative 
fair use has also been inconsistently applied in the infringement context. See Century 21 
Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir. 2005); Playboy Enters., 279 
F.3d at 801. Since New Kids on the Block, the Ninth Circuit has held that nominative fair use 
is not an affirmative defense as classic fair use is, but instead, when the analysis is relevant, 
the court should apply the three-part test of New Kids on the Block instead of the standard 
eight-part test for likelihood of confusion. See Playboy Enters., 279 F.3d at 801 (finding that 
the three-factor test should be applied instead of the test for likelihood of confusion). The 
Third Circuit, however, has used the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use as an affirmative 
defense like classic fair use. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 425 F.3d at 232 (applying a 
slightly modified three factor nominative use test adapted from New Kids on the Block as an 
affirmative defense). 
112 See infra App. 
113 See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1098−99 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (recognizing nominative use doctrine in an infringement context, protecting 
those who use another’s trademark for comparison, criticism, or point of reference); Haute 
Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 266 (noting that nominative fair use is a statutory defense under 
the TDRA); Christine Haight Farley, Why Are We Confused About the Trademark Dilution Law, 
16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J, 1175, 1176 (2006) (noting dilution law’s 
disregard for the confusion test). 
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Whereas dilution by tarnishment claims rest upon the theory of pro-
tecting the goodwill of the mark holder, trademark infringement 
claims rely upon the underlying rationale of preventing consumer con-
fusion as to the source or sponsor of a good or service.114 Using the 
nominative fair use defense in an infringement context as an example, 
artists can argue they use trademarks in a non-confusing way in order to 
describe the mark holder’s products.115 This was the case in 2003 in 
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions before the Ninth Circuit.116 
There, an artist incorporated images of Barbie in his photographs in 
less than favorable settings and positions.117 The court held the artist 
was not liable for trademark infringement because there was no likeli-
hood that the public would believe Mattel endorsed the photographs 
and therefore there was no confusion.118 This policy of preventing con-
sumer confusion animates the law of trademark infringement.119 Thus 
when the use of a trademark poses no risk of confusion, punishment of 
the junior user serves no purpose.120 Dilution law, on the other hand, 
does not share trademark infringement’s concern with confusion but it 
now shares its nominative use defense.121 
 The TDRA also now explicitly includes parody as a fair use de-
fense.122 The fair use exception includes “identifying and parodying, crit-
icizing, or commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or 
services of the famous mark owner.”123 A tarnishing use will not be ac-
tionable dilution if it parodies the famous mark or the goods or services 
                                                                                                                      
114 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Roe, supra note 13, at 573. 
115 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
116 See 353 F.3d at 808. 
117 See id. at 796. An example of one of the artist’s works was his “Fondue a la Barbie,” 
which depicts Barbie heads in a fondue pot. Id. 
118 See id. at 808–12 (using the nominative fair use and not the artistic relevance test 
because a trade dress, not trademark, was involved). The artist was referring to Barbie as a 
point of reference, and as such, his use of the trade dress in Mattel fit within the nomina-
tive fair use exception. See id. In cases of nominative fair use, there is no concern for likeli-
hood of confusion regarding the sponsorship or endorsement of a product because the 
mark is in fact describing plaintiff’s product. See Brother Records, Inc. v. Jardine, 318 F.3d 
900, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003). 
119 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305–06. 
120 See 4 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 23:11. 
121 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), (3)(A) (2006). 
122 See id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii); Gunnell, supra note 31, at 442. With parody now a 
bright line exception, a consistent definition of parody in a dilution context is vital and 
will be discussed in Part V. See infra notes 310–322 and accompanying text. It is important 
to note that if a diluter uses the mark as his own source designation, then a parody defense 
would not apply as the statute forbids fair use when the mark is used as its own source des-
ignation. See Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 266. 
123 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
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of the mark owner.124 Courts have not addressed whether the mark 
must be the target or merely a weapon of the parody.125 In 2007, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Louis Vuitton Malletier 
S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog defined parody as “a simple form of entertain-
ment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the 
trademark with the idealized image created by the mark’s owner.”126 
The court explained that the parody must convey that it is the original 
but at the same time not the original and instead, a parody.127 In indi-
cating the mark is a parody, it must not only differentiate the parody 
from the original mark, but must also communicate “satire, ridicule, 
joking, or amusement.”128 This somewhat complex definition of parody 
has been relied upon by other courts.129 The definition, however, bears 
no mention of the extent to which the mark must be the subject of the 
parody.130 With the broadening of the fair use defense to include nom-
inative fair use and an unclear understanding of parody, artists may 
have greater protection.131 
D. Comparison of the TDRA Defenses to Trademark Infringement’s  
Artistic Relevance Test 
 Although trademark infringement and dilution both recognize the 
nominative fair use defense, only trademark infringement law specifi-
cally addresses use of a trademark in an artistic context.132 In contrast 
to trademark dilution law’s balancing of the public’s interest with that 
of the mark owners’ via the TDRA exemptions, courts in the trademark 
                                                                                                                      
124 See id.; Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (finding that defendant’s domain names and 
website merchandise analogizing Wal-Mart to Nazis and al-Qaeda were parodic works con-
sidered noncommercial speech and therefore not subject to Wal-Mart’s trademark dilution 
claims). 
125 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812; Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316; Gun-
nell, supra note 31, at 468–69; Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. Legal 
Stud. 1, 67 (1992) (arguing that fair use should provide a defense to copyright infringe-
ment only if the parody uses the work as a target). 
126 507 F.3d at 260. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. (noting that a parody relies upon a difference from the original mark, presuma-
bly a humorous difference). 
129 See Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 113; Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. 
130 See Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260 (noting that the Louis Vuitton handbags are 
the target of the imitation of the parody, but only to assure that the parody represents the 
original mark); Gunnell, supra note 31, at 465−68. But see Burstein, supra note 7, at 1244 
(interpreting the TDRA parody exclusion to mean that the parodist must actually target 
the mark). 
131 See supra notes 107−130 and accompanying text. 
132 See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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infringement context have recognized the existence of an Artistic Rele-
vance Test that balances the public interest in avoiding consumer con-
fusion with the public interest in free expression.133 
 In the landmark 1989 decision Rogers v. Grimaldi, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit introduced the Artistic Relevance Test to 
balance an artist’s rights to free expression with the mark holder’s rights 
under the Lanham Act.134 In Grimaldi, the Second Circuit concluded 
that the Lanham Act does not apply to artistic works unless the public 
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in 
free expression.135 That balance will normally not support application of 
the Lanham Act unless the title—or artistic work in general—has no 
artistic relevance to the work, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless 
the title misleads as to the source or content of the work.136 The Artistic 
                                                                                                                      
 
133See id.; Michael Grynberg, The Judicial Role in Trademark Law, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1283, 
1308–09 (2011) (noting that when a claim is based on a trademarked brand in art, courts 
construct balancing tests to address First Amendment concerns). There have been two 
other tests that address First Amendment concerns: the likelihood of confusion test and 
the alternative avenues test. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003). 
Under the likelihood of confusion test, the court asks whether the alleged infringement 
was likely to cause public confusion as to the source or sponsor of a particular good or 
service. See id. at 445, 447; Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Am.’s Team Props., Inc., 
616 F. Supp. 2d 622, 636 (N.D. Tex. 2009). This test has been reserved, however, for tradi-
tional trademark cases where artistic use is not at issue, as it does not always adequately 
give weight to First Amendment interests. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 447−49. Under the alterna-
tive avenues test, a title of an expressive work will not be protected if there are sufficient 
alternative means for an artist to convey his or her idea. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that a company 
releasing a pornographic film had other available avenues of expressing their message). 
This approach has been rejected on the basis that it calls for courts to suggest that artists 
could just have easily expressed their message without using the mark. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 
450. 
134 See 875 F.2d at 999 (creating a test that would more sufficiently accommodate pub-
lic interest in free expression). In the case, actress Ginger Rogers sued an artist, who used 
her name in the title of a fictional movie, for trademark infringement. See id. at 996. 
135 See id. at 999. This test has been adopted by panels in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for 
the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits as the most appropriate way of balanc-
ing the competing interests of artists and trademark holders. See Parks, 329 F.3d at 1742; 
MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902; Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 (5th Cir. 
1999); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 
1996); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d 
Cir. 1989); Kerry Timbers & Julia Huston, The “Artistic Relevance Test” Just Became Relevant: 
The Increasing Strength of the First Amendment as a Defense to Trademark Infringement and Dilu-
tion, 93 Trademark Rep. 1278, 1290−95 (2003). 
136 See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 (holding that the Rogers balancing approach extends 
beyond titles and is more broadly applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic 
expression); Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 999. Under the first prong of the test, First Amendment 
protection is guaranteed unless the use of the trademark has zero artistic relevance to the 
work as a whole. See Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 999. The second prong of the test states that even 
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Relevance Test operates under the rationale that artistic expression is a 
form of speech owed special protection under the First Amendment, 
but not absolute immunity.137 The TDRA’s rigid defenses, on the other 
hand, bear no recognition to the limits of artistic expression.138 
II. Artistic Expression and Copyright Law 
 Unlike the broad statutory exclusions under the TDRA, the Copy-
right Act uses a four factor “fair use” test to ensure that First Amend-
ment concerns are met.139 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
fair use doctrine fully accommodates the tension between copyright 
protection and free speech.140 This test, as well as the artistic relevance 
test, allows courts to conduct a more flexible analysis than is permitted 
by the stone-carved statutory exceptions shielding artists from liability 
in the TDRA.141 This Part continues to address the tension between 
First Amendment rights and intellectual property rights by reference to 
the fair use balancing test in copyright law.142 
A. Copyright Infringement and the Fair Use Defense 
 Just as dilution by tarnishment protects the goodwill investment of 
mark holders, copyright protection similarly extends to an author’s 
                                                                                                                      
if there is some artistic relevance, use of the mark will still be actionable if it explicitly mis-
leads as to the source or content of the work. See id. In Walking Mountain Products, for ex-
ample, an analysis of the two prongs showed that the public interest in free expression 
outweighed any potential consumer confusion surrounding the sponsorship of the work. 
See 353 F.3d at 807. Weighing in favor of the artist under the first prong of the test, the use 
of the Barbie name in the title of the work accurately described the subject of the photo-
graphs, so was relevant to the work. See id. Second, the court found that the titles did not 
explicitly mislead as to Mattel’s sponsorship of the works. See id. 
137 See Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 999. One court has gone as far as to say that the First 
Amendment “cannot permit anyone who cries ‘artist’ to have carte blanche when it comes to 
naming and advertising his or her works, art though it may be.” See Parks, 329 F.3d at 447. 
138 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006) (including three broad defenses excluding 
artists from liability), with Grimaldi, 875 F.2d at 999 (applying a test specifically designed to 
balance trademark policy with First Amendment concerns in artistic works). 
139 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Remeirdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
140 See Universal City Studios, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 220 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). Expression prohibited by the Copyright Act 
and not within the realm of the fair use exception is considered unprotected by the First 
Amendment. See id. 
141 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 308−09; Gulasekaram, supra note 10, at 887 (noting that in 
trademark law mark owners should rarely prevail). 
142 See infra notes 143−173 and accompanying text. 
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honor and reputation.143 Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers ex-
clusive rights to the copyright owner.144 A prima facie claim of copy-
right infringement requires the ownership of a valid copyright and the 
copying of original elements of the work.145 
                                                                                                                     
 The Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine adequately balances the con-
stitutional grant of copyright protection with free speech under the 
First Amendment.146 Despite the constitutional right, some critics still 
argue that copyright law restricts speech.147 First Amendment protec-
tions, however, already exist in the Copyright Act’s distinction between 
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas.148 Also, 
the Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment is not a 
shield for copyright infringement, explaining that any tension that may 
lie between free speech and copyright law can be properly addressed by 
the fair use doctrine.149 
 The fair use doctrine in copyright law is more flexible than the 
statutory fair use defense for trademark dilution by tarnishment.150 Pur-
suant to section 107 of the Copyright Act, fair use of a copyrighted work 
is not an infringement.151 Although a descriptive or nominative use of a 
mark is automatically considered fair use under the TDRA, fair use un-
 
143 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a), 106A (2006) (providing that works of authorship include liter-
ary, musical, pictorial, and graphic works among others); Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 826; 
Roe, supra note 13, at 604 (comparing tarnishment coverage with copyright law’s moral 
rights doctrine). But see Roe, supra note 13, at 571 (noting that unlike copyrights, trade-
marks do not offer the mark owner a monopoly and do not benefit the public like copy-
rights). 
144 17 U.S.C. § 106. Subject to section 102, however, an author may not copyright facts 
or ideas—only “‘expression’ —that display[s] the stamp of the author’s originality.” Harper 
& Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. 539 at 547; see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The dividing line be-
tween idea and expression strikes a proper balance between the Copyright Act and the 
First Amendment because it protects expression and allows the dissemination of facts and 
ideas. See Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 556. 
145 See Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
146 See Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 546–47. The rights conferred by copyright 
are designed to assure these contributors to society a fair return for their work. Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). The Constitution states, “The 
Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
147 See Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 Duke L.J. 147, 165−66 (1998). 
148 See Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 547, 556. 
149 See id. at 547. 
150 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. Fair use under the TDRA includes nominative and de-
scriptive use; both are affirmative defenses that require no balancing test. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006). 
151 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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der copyright law is determined through a four-factor balancing test.152 
These factors are (1) the purpose and character of the use, (2) the na-
ture of the copyrighted work, (3) the amount of the portion used, and 
(4) the effect the use has upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.153 
B. Artist Failing Under a Fair Use Defense: Rogers v. Koons 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 1992 decision 
Rogers v. Koons illustrates the superior treatment that copyright owners 
may receive under copyright law as opposed to trademark holders un-
der dilution by tarnishment law.154 In that case, an artist, Jeff Koons, 
was found liable for copyright infringement for using a copyrighted 
photograph as the basis of his sculpture.155 Art Rogers, a photographer 
of little renown, brought suit against Jeff Koons.156 He accused Koons 
of infringement of his copyrighted photograph “Puppies” from which 
Koons, aware of the copyright, created his sculpture “String of Pup-
pies.”157 Koons displayed the sculpture at a gallery and sold four copies 
of the work.158 Rogers satisfied the prima facie elements of the claim— 
that he owned the copyright and that Koons copied the protected ma-
terial without authorization.159 Then, the court held that Koons’s use 
was not exempt from liability under the fair use doctrine.160 
 Under the first fair use factor—purpose and character of the use— 
the court examined the commercial nature of Koons’s work and 
whether it was a parody or satire.161 In finding that Koons’s sculpture 
was commercial in nature, the court noted that copies made for “com-
mercial or profit-making purposes are presumptively unfair.”162 The 
“crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of 
the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploi-
                                                                                                                      
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Compare Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that an artist using the Barbie trademark is protected from a dilution by tarnish-
ment claim), with Koons, 960 F.2d at 301 (holding that an artist copying a photographer’s 
work is liable for copyright infringement). 
155 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 303. 
156 Id. at 303−05. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 305. 
159 See id. 
160 Id. at 308. 
161 Koons, 960 F.2d at 309. 
162 Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 
(1984)). 
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tation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary 
price.”163 Despite the artistic nature of Koons’s sculpture, he profited 
from the copying so the court held that his use was commercial in na-
ture and against a finding of fair use.164 Conversely, under the TDRA 
interpretation of commerciality, a court would find Koons’s work as 
noncommercial because of dilution law’s focus on whether the work is 
purely commercial.165 
 Having deemed the sculpture commercial, the court turned to the 
next question under the first factor: whether the work was a parody of 
the copyrighted photograph.166 The court defined parody as when an 
artist, for comic effect or social commentary, closely imitates the style of 
another artist, creating a new artwork that ridicules the style and ex-
pression of the original.167 The court acknowledged that the criticism 
in parodic works fosters creativity and free expression, but held that for 
a work to be a parody, the copied work must be at least in part an object 
of the parody.168 The court concluded that although the work was a 
satirical critique of our materialistic society, it did not necessarily par-
ody Rogers’s photograph itself.169 
                                                                                                                     
 This parody analysis bears no resemblance to that of the parody 
analysis in the trademark dilution cases.170 Here, the court asked 
whether the potential infringer used the copied work as the target of 
 
163 See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 562). The 
logic underlying this analysis is opposite that in determining whether a work is noncom-
mercial in a dilution by tarnishment claim where a work is deemed noncommercial if it 
does any more than propose a commercial transaction. See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 
F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
164 Koons, 960 F.2d at 309. 
165 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 
166 Koons, 960 F.2d at 309−10. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 310. 
169 Id. The remaining three factors all militated against a finding of fair use. See id. at 
309. The second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—led the court to conclude 
that it went against fair use because the copyrighted work was one of original expression 
that Rogers used to gain a financial return. Id. The third factor included the amount and 
substantiality of the work used. Id. at 308, 310−11. The copied work was the essence of 
Koons’s photograph and also militated against a finding of fair use. Id. at 310−11. The last 
factor—the effect of the use on the market value of the original—led the court to con-
clude that Koons’s intention to create String of Puppies to generate high profits would 
harm future earning potential of Rogers’s photograph. Id. at 311−12. 
170 Compare Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 
(4th Cir. 2007) (defining parody as a form of entertainment “conveyed by juxtaposing the 
irreverent representation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the mark’s 
owner”), with Koons, 960 F.2d at 310 (stating that the copied work must be an object of the 
parody). 
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the parody, otherwise “there would be no need to conjure up the origi-
nal work.”171 In the trademark dilution context, on the other hand, a 
parody is defined as a form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing 
the representation of the mark with the image created by the owner.172 
Nothing in the trademark dilution version of parody requires that the 
mark be the target of the parody.173 
III. Artistic Expression and the Right of Publicity 
 As with trademark dilution, trademark infringement, and copyright 
infringement, there is an inherent tension between one’s right of pub-
licity and the right to freedom of expression under the First Amend-
ment.174 This Part examines the manner in which courts balance the 
right of publicity with First Amendment concerns in cases of artistic ex-
pression.175 
A. Right of Publicity and Artistic Expression 
 Like copyright and trademark law, the right of publicity is an intel-
lectual property right.176 Unlike the federal copyright and trademark 
protections, however, the right of publicity is only recognized at state 
law.177 It has been defined as the “inherent right of every human being 
to control the commercial use of his or her identity.”178 The right of 
publicity protects the time and energy one spends in building a name 
and image, and a violation of this right occurs when someone uses rec-
ognizable characteristics of an individual’s persona on products or for 
advertising or selling such products without permission.179 
 About half the states explicitly recognize a right of publicity,180 and 
when a plaintiff’s identity is used in an expressive work, courts have 
                                                                                                                      
171 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310. 
172 See Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260. 
173 Id. 
174 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 931 (6th Cir. 2003). 
175 See infra notes 176−201 and accompanying text. 
176 See 5 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 28:41. 
177See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 919; Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
178 See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 928. 
179 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); 
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 801 (Cal. 2001); Thomas Phillip 
Boggess, Cause of Action for an Infringement on the Right of Publicity, in 31 Causes of Action 
2d 121, 144 (Clark Kimball & Mark Pickering eds., 2006). 
180 Publicity, Legal Info. Inst., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/Publicity (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2012). 
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balanced an individual’s proprietary right of publicity with an artist’s 
First Amendment right to free expression.181 California, for example, 
has used a “transformative” test to determine whether an artist added 
enough new elements to his works to avoid liability under right of pub-
licity doctrine.182 When the artwork is a literal depiction—lacking any 
transformative elements—of a celebrity for commercial gain, the right 
of publicity of the celebrity outweighs the expressive interests of the 
artist.183 
 Just as companies have a right to control their marks and creators 
of original works hold rights to their ideas, every human being has the 
right to control the commercial use of his identity.184 In this respect, 
trademark dilution theory’s attempt to protect the goodwill investment 
of mark holders finds its parallel in the right of publicity’s purpose of 
safeguarding the individual’s “enjoyment of the fruits of her labors . . . 
and preventing unjust enrichment.”185 Despite these similar interests, 
there is a more carefully constructed balance between the right of pub-
licity and the First Amendment than in dilution by tarnishment where 
the Lanham Act ingrains its First Amendment protections through 
statutorily defined affirmative defenses.186 
 Another difference in the two doctrines lies in the fame of the ce-
lebrity or mark.187 Unlike the TDRA, in right of publicity doctrine there 
is no fame requirement that a claimant must meet to have a cause of 
                                                                                                                      
181 See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931; Parks, 329 F.3d at 461; Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 
810; 5 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 28:41. But see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the 
Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903, 929 (2003) (opposing the right of publicity as un-
constitutionally constricting the right to free speech). These balancing tests vary from state 
to state yet serve the same purpose of balancing the state law interest with the interest in 
free expression. 5 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 28:41. One court has used a “predominant 
use” test which examines whether the predominant use of the work is commercial or ex-
pressive. See Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 57, 59 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 2006) (holding 
that the defendant’s comic book, which featured a fictional character based on a profes-
sional hockey player, was not protected as free speech because the primary use of the 
plaintiff’s identity was commercial and not expressive). 
182 See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808−10. In addition to the transformative test, First 
Amendment concerns are also met by a California statute that exempts from right of pub-
licity claims any use in connection with news, public affairs, sports broadcast, or political 
campaign, as well as expressive works such as plays, newspapers, films, and single and orig-
inal works of art. Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (West 2011). 
183 See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808. 
184 See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 928. 
185 See id. at 954; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A 
Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 Ind. L.J. 47, 54 (1994). 
186 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006); ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 931, 937−38 (weighing 
Tiger Woods’s right of publicity against an artist’s work, and finding in favor of the artist). 
187 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A); Boggess, supra note 179, at 144, 179. 
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action.188 The level of fame is simply an indicator of how much damage 
defendant’s use will do to the commercial value of that persona.189 
 Each doctrine’s analysis of commerciality also differs.190 In both 
right of publicity and trademark dilution law, an artist does not lose 
First Amendment protection just because part of the artist’s expressive 
work was created for a commercial purpose.191 But unlike dilution by 
tarnishment, if a work is deemed a form of noncommercial speech in a 
right of publicity claim, it is not immediately immune from liability.192 
B. Noncommercial Yet Unprotected?: A Test for Transformity in  
Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 
 In Comedy III Productions, Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., the California 
Supreme Court in 2001 found that the First Amendment did not pro-
tect an artist’s work despite being noncommercial speech.193 The court 
used the “transformative” test to balance the right of publicity with First 
Amendment concerns.194 There, a production company that owned the 
rights to the Three Stooges comedy act sued an artist for his depiction 
of the Three Stooges which was reprinted as lithographs and on t-shirts 
for sale.195 Although the court acknowledged that the portraits were 
sold for financial gain, it categorized them as noncommercial speech.196 
Nevertheless, the court noted that not “all expression that trenches on 
                                                                                                                      
188 See Boggess, supra note 179, at 144 (listing elements of a right of publicity claim and 
not including any fame requirement), 179 (noting that damages for infringement can be 
determined for both famous and unknown people). 
189 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995). Another differ-
ence between the two areas of law is that in right of publicity cases, even if the infringing 
work is expressive, such uses may not be protected if the name or likeness is only used to 
attract attention to a work unrelated to the identified person. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 
930−31. Similarly, unlike dilution law where parody has been statutorily added as a de-
fense, whether parody can serve as a defense to right of publicity claims is a controversial 
issue. See 5 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 28:41. 
190 See infra notes 191−192 and accompanying text. 
191 See Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 2001); Comedy 
III Prods., 21 P.3d at 802. Any commercial aspects that are “inextricably entwined” with a 
work’s expressive elements will not make the work ineligible for First Amendment protec-
tion as free speech. See Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1185 (quoting Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc’y v. City 
& Cnty. of S.F., 952 F.2d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
192See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804; infra notes 193−201 and accompanying text. 
193 See 21 P.3d at 811. 
194 Id. at 808. 
195 Id. at 800. 
196 See id. at 802 (finding that an expressive work will not lose constitutional protection 
if it was done for financial gain). 
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the right of publicity receives such protection.”197 Rather than immedi-
ately shielding the expressive works under the First Amendment, the 
court looked to the fair use doctrine from copyright law, focusing on the 
first factor of that test: “purpose and character of the use.”198 Drawing 
on the first factor, the court turned its inquiry to whether the artist’s 
work was transformative.199 Applying this “transformative” test to the 
facts, the court held that the artist’s images of the Three Stooges were 
not protected by the First Amendment because they were literal depic-
tions lacking any transformative elements.200 Thus for the right of pub-
licity, First Amendment protection can be raised as a defense for non-
commercial works, but under the “transformative” test, only to the 
extent that the expressive work contains transformative elements.201 
IV. Deficiencies in the Current Analytical Framework  
for Dilution by Tarnishment 
 Under current dilution law, artist Max Papeschi would wrongly 
avoid liability for his abuse of Disney trademarks in his art.202 The ra-
ther stark contrast of a Disney trademark juxtaposed with a swastika is 
strikingly tarnishing to the Disney icon.203 The artist has even said that 
his Mickey Mouse loses its “reassuring effect and change[s] into a col-
lective nightmare” in his work.204 
                                                                                                                      
197 Id. at 804. 
198 Id. at 808. This test is based on the first factor of the copyright fair use test— “pur-
pose and character of the use” —because the purpose of that factor is to see if the new 
work adds something new and whether it is transformative. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). 
199 See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808 (noting that the purpose of the fair use factor is 
to see whether the work imbues the original work with new expression or meaning). The 
court believed the transformative quality of a work appropriately balanced the right of 
publicity with the First Amendment because the less transformative and more literal an 
artistic work is, the more the state’s interest in protecting an individual’s right to publicity 
outweighs the interests of the imitative artist. See id. 
200 Id. at 811. 
201 See id. at 810; see also ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 937−38 (concluding that under the 
transformative test, Tiger Woods’s right of publicity is outweighed by the First Amendment 
rights of an artist who added significant creative elements to his painting, which was sold 
in limited-edition prints and featured Tiger Woods). 
202See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). By referring to Papeschi’s work, I am simply provid-
ing a visual example of an artist’s tarnishing use of a trademark and am not implying that 
the FTDA applies extraterritorially. 
203 See id. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
204 See Grieshaber, supra note 2. 
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 Despite clear tarnishment, no remedy would exist for Disney un-
der the TDRA.205 In copyright law, if an original work is copied by an 
artist for purposes of criticism or comment, the use may be a fair use, 
but it is first subject to a four-factor test.206 In right of publicity cases, 
courts balance the right of publicity with First Amendment interests, 
using tests such as the transformative test from the California Supreme 
Court’s decision Comedy III Productions v. Gary Saderup, Inc. in 2001.207 
There is no such analysis in dilution by tarnishment cases.208 Instead, 
the broad defenses under the TDRA purportedly balance the public’s 
interest with that of the mark owners.209 Despite this built-in balancing 
of conflicting interests, however, application of the TDRA to expressive 
works will lead to an uneven balancing toward the artist.210 There are 
several facets of the TDRA that make it unable to properly regulate ex-
pressive works.211 
 This Part highlights the ineffectiveness of the TDRA in regulating 
expressive works by examining four parts of the statute that make it in-
applicable to uses outside the mainstream commercial market.212 Sec-
tion A explains how the trademark use requirement allows artists to es-
cape liability.213 Section B discusses the “famous mark” requirement as a 
barrier for mark holders of lesser known marks.214 Section C suggests 
that under the courts’ interpretations of the noncommercial use ex-
emption, works of art will be protected from the statute’s scope despite 
their place in a commercial art world.215 Section D explains how the 
nominative fair use defense does not belong in tarnishment law and 
how this defense, as well as parody, tilts the TDRA in favor of artists.216 
                                                                                                                      
205 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
206 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992). 
207 See 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001). 
208 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
209 See Lockridge, supra note 13, at 369; Roe, supra note 13, at 585. 
210 See Gulasekaram, supra note 10, at 887. 
211 See infra notes 217−286 and accompanying text. 
212 See infra notes 217−286 and accompanying text. 
213 See infra notes 217−232 and accompanying text. 
214 See infra notes 233−247 and accompanying text. 
215 See infra notes 248−263 and accompanying text. 
216 See infra notes 264−286 and accompanying text. 
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A. Use of Trademark Deficiency 
 The first way in which the TDRA allows artists to escape liability at 
the expense of mark holders is the trademark use requirement.217 To 
be liable for dilution, defendants must use marks as trademarks.218 Art-
ists, however, use marks expressively and not as source indicators for 
their own artwork.219 An example of an artist using a famous trademark 
in a non-trademark manner is one who depicts Barbie in his photo-
graphs for purely artistic purposes rather than as a brand for his photo-
graphs.220 Similarly, Max Papeschi used the Mickey Mouse head not to 
serve as a trademark for his own work, but to comment upon society in 
an artistic manner.221 Conversely, an example of a trademark use is a 
coffee retailer using “Charbucks” marks on their coffee products, serv-
ing as a brand name for the coffee company’s retail products.222 The 
TDRA’s limitation to trademark uses ignores the fact that non-
trademark uses (such as Papeschi’s Mickey Mouse) are just as dilutive as 
trademark uses.223 Nevertheless, in the case of “NaziSexyMouse,” Pape-
schi’s tarnishing use would fall outside the scope of the statute because 
his depiction of the Mickey Mouse mark does not function as a trade-
mark.224 
 The shield of artistic works resulting from a prohibition limited to 
trademark uses thwarts tarnishment theory’s broader goal—preventing 
the portrayal of a mark in an unwholesome context that tarnishes the 
reputation and goodwill investment in the famous mark.225 As con-
sumer confusion is not the backbone to dilution theory, there is no rea-
                                                                                                                      
217 See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1226 (discussing that under the TDRA only use as a 
mark or trade name is actionable). 
218 See id. 
219 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the defendant used images of Barbie for purposes of social and political overtones); Paul 
Alan Levy, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act—A Consumer Perspective, 16 Fordham Intell. 
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1189, 1210 (2006) (describing an artist who drew a Volkswagen 
“bug” composed of insect parts as a visual pun). 
220 Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 796. The appearance of Barbie in the photo-
graphs was actually an issue of trade dress that refers to the visual appearance of a product 
that signifies its source. Id. at 808. In addition to trademark dilution, the TDRA also ap-
plies to trade dress dilution. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2006). 
221 See Brothers, supra note 1. 
222 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2009). 
223 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2002) (rea-
soning that although exempt under the noncommercial use exception of the TDRA, the 
non-trademark use of Barbie in a song title was dilutive); Eastman Kodak Co. v. D.B. Ra-
kow, 739 F. Supp. 116, 118−19 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1221. 
225 See LaFrance, supra note 6, at 206–07. 
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son why non-trademark uses should be considered less tarnishing than 
trademark uses.226 Dilution law usually applies when parties do not op-
erate in “competitive or closely related product lines,” so the require-
ment that the use be as a trademark has no bearing on the level of dilu-
tion.227 
 The opposition to a trademark use requirement for all dilution 
actions in a draft of the TDRA suggests that perhaps the inclusion of a 
trademark use in the statutory interpretation was not even intended by 
Congress.228 One draft defined dilution by tarnishment as an “associa-
tion arising from the similarity between a designation of source and a fa-
mous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”229 This lan-
guage in the draft was opposed as being overbroad and unnecessary, 
preventing claims for tarnishment when defendant’s use of the mark is 
not as a designation of source for its own goods.230 This language was 
removed before the TDRA passed in 2006, suggesting a win for trade-
mark owners.231 Despite the removal of the “source designation” lan-
guage, the statute has nevertheless been read to require the use to 
function as a trademark, thus providing a quick and concrete shield for 
artists.232 
                                                                                                                      
226 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
227 See Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 368, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); 4 
McCarthy, supra note 15, § 24:72 (noting that anti-dilution theory was conceived to pro-
tect strong marks against a diluting use far removed from the area of commerce of the 
famous mark). 
228 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 17–19 (2005); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1221. 
229 See H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 19 (emphasis added) (adopting a requirement that for 
a defendant’s use to be tarnishing, the defendant must use the mark as a means of identi-
fying his own products); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1221. 
230 See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1222 (citing Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: 
Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property, Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 224 (2005) (statement of William G. Barber, Am. Intellectual 
Prop. Law Ass’n)). 
231 See William G. Barber, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Breathing Life Back 
into the Federal Dilutions Statute, 16 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1113, 1132 
(2006); Burstein, supra note 7, at 1222. 
232 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (requiring “use of a mark or trade name”); Tif-
fany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 112 (2d Cir. 2010); Burstein, supra note 7, at 
1223−24. The use must be as a “mark” or “trade name” and the Lanham Act defines mark 
to include any name used by a person to identify his business, and trade name to include 
any trademark used to indicate the source of goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); supra notes 73−75 
and accompanying text. 
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B. Nationally Famous Mark Deficiency 
 A second way the TDRA provides too much protection for artists is 
the requirement that the mark be nationally famous.233 By hinging 
fame on whether a mark “is widely recognized by the general consum-
ing public of the United States,” the TDRA fails to cover an entire cate-
gory of marks that would have received protection under the FTDA.234 
Most courts no longer consider a mark famous if it is well known in 
merely one geographic region or a market niche.235 With the scope of 
fame much narrower than it was under the FTDA, mark holders with 
lesser known marks are unprotected despite the money and effort they 
invested in the selling power of their mark.236 
 Some scholars opine that the new fame requirement helps prevent 
the over protection of marks.237 As some commentators see it, the 
TDRA benefits mark holders by not requiring a demonstration of con-
sumer confusion, and the fame requirement is a counterweight to this 
concession to mark holders.238 But the TDRA already contains a strong 
set of affirmative defenses that will excuse diluters from liability.239 The 
primary dilution by tarnishment theory of preventing the tarnishment 
of a mark’s quality is thwarted if regionally well-known marks are pre-
cluded from receiving TDRA protections solely on account of the na-
tional fame requirement.240 By no longer allowing fame in a niche 
market to suffice, tarnishment within a smaller scope is effectively ig-
nored.241 
                                                                                                                      
233 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2); supra notes 76−87 and accompanying text. 
234 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A); Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 
908 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding plaintiff’s operation in a narrow market sufficient under the 
FTDA ). 
235 See Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that the 2006 TDRA “eliminated any possibility of ‘niche fame,’ which some courts 
had recognized before the amendment”). 
236 See Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 105; Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. ex rel. Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin v. KST Elec., Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 677−79 (W.D. Tex. 2008). Determin-
ing the level of fame has been a source of controversy and as some courts have still looked 
at FTDA case law to determine the strength of a mark, perhaps the appropriate standard 
has not yet been reached. See Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824, 830 (S.D. Tex. 
2007) (looking to the FTDA and holding that Pet Silk has name recognition in the pet 
supply and dog grooming market, and noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has held that market fame is sufficient); Roe, supra note 13, at 601. 
237 See, e.g., Gunnell, supra note 31, at 450. 
238 See, e.g., id. 
239 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
240 See KST Elec., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 675; Schechter, supra note 41, at 825. 
241 See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1217−18 (stating that several cases have already been 
denied relief because the plaintiff’s mark was not sufficiently famous). 
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 It is clear that the more famous the mark is, the more that mark has 
at stake in terms of having its reputation tarnished, but this does not 
mean that national fame should be a requirement.242 Proving national 
fame can be difficult for mark holders: for example, the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Texas held that the University of Tex-
as’s longhorn silhouette logo was not nationally famous in the 2008 case 
Board of Regents, University of Texas System ex rel. University of Texas at Austin 
v. KST Electric Ltd.243 Further, negative associations can still result in in-
jury to the reputation, and thus selling power, of the mark that is merely 
famous in a niche market.244 State anti-dilution laws only require that 
the mark have sufficient distinctiveness and do not require the same 
level of fame as the TDRA.245 Goodwill investment in the creation and 
maintenance of a trademark is motivated by the expectation that all 
mark holders will enjoy returns from their investments.246 If dilution 
protection only extends to nationally famous marks, then mark holders 
in niche markets may lose the motivation to make such investments.247 
C. Noncommercial Use Complications 
 The TDRA’s noncommercial use exclusion is the third way the 
TDRA prevents mark holders from protection against artists.248 It is 
true that the Lanham Act was not intended to extend protection be-
yond the boundaries of commercial speech, and that expressive works 
are de facto forms of noncommercial speech safeguarded under the 
First Amendment.249 But new technologies and evolving methods of 
advertising and selling products complicate the rigid interpretation of 
                                                                                                                      
242 Compare Malletier, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 391 (requiring national fame), and Nike, Inc., 
v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., No. 2:050cv01468-GEB-JFM, 2007 WL 2782030, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. 
Sept. 18, 2007) (requiring national fame), with ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 
915, 953 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the possession of a right of publicity should not de-
pend on one’s celebrity status but rather that celebrity status is relevant for purposes of 
determining the economic value of the plaintiff’s identity). 
243 See KST Elec., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 675. 
244 See id. at 675, 678. 
245 See LaFrance, supra note 6, at 208–09 (noting, however, that states have been fol-
lowing the trend to incorporate some “fame” requirement into their statutes in order to 
conform to the federal statute). 
246 See Tony Martino, Trademark Dilution 81 (1996). 
247 See id. 
248 See Timbers & Huston, supra note 135, at 1294−95 (noting that the “purely com-
mercial speech” reasoning could “vitiate the federal dilution statute for artistic works”); 
infra notes 249−263 and accompanying text. 
249 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 904; Goldsmith, supra note 36, at 861. 
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the TDRA’s noncommercial use exception.250 When the present non-
commercial use exception is applied to “NaziSexyMouse,” it is clear that 
Papeschi would be able to freely use the Disney mark.251 Courts would 
likely acknowledge the commercial profits from the sale and advertis-
ing of Papeschi’s work, but then they would also recognize that, in line 
with prior cases, such profits do not overpower the noncommercial as-
pects of the artwork.252 Thus the commercial nature of Papeschi’s ad-
vertisement would have no bearing on the rigid interpretation of the 
noncommercial use defense.253 
 Such an interpretation enables courts to protect, as noncommercial 
uses, expressive works that use a mark to generate commercial profit 
because their purpose is not “purely commercial.”254 But the evolving 
relationship between art and commercialism renders the “purely com-
mercial purpose” reasoning moot.255 As commercialism in artistic works 
increases, this boundary between commercial and noncommercial uses 
blurs, making it harder to determine the primary purpose in creating 
the work.256 An expressive work with some commercial purpose should 
no longer be automatically exempted under the TDRA as “noncom-
mercial.”257 Artworks which generate millions in revenue via public auc-
tions and commercial advertising should receive the same treatment as a 
company using a mark for commercial, advertising purposes.258 In to-
day’s world, artists stand to profit from their creations, and at times this 
profit is at the expense of the holders of famous marks.259 With such a 
                                                                                                                      
250 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 906 (noting that the line between commercial and 
noncommercial speech is not clearly delineated); Gulasekaram, supra note 10, at 887, 933, 
940 (discussing the increasingly commercial role of film and the pressure it places on the 
commercial/noncommercial boundary); Joern, supra note 6, at 293. 
251 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812; Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. 
Supp. 2d 1302, 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
252 See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 905−06; Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. 
253 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812; Lockridge, supra note 13, at 355−56. 
254 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 796; MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 905; Gunnell, 
supra note 31, at 455−56. 
255 See infra notes 256−263 and accompanying text. 
256 See Gulasekaram, supra note 10, at 941−42; Auction Results for Damien Hirst’s Beautiful 
Inside My Head Forever Evening Sale, Sotheby’s, http://www.sothebys.com /app/live/lot/ 
LotResultsDetailList.jsp?event_id=28883&sale_number=L08027 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). 
In 2008, Sotheby’s held an evening sale for the works of one contemporary artist, Damien 
Hirst. See id. The artist earned £70,545,100 for the sale of his works alone. See id. 
257 See Kinsella, supra note 105, at 98−99. 
258 See id. at 98−99, 103 (noting the way in which contemporary artists treat their works 
as brands). 
259 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812; Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 
441 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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broad exception applying to all expressive works, even those with com-
mercial aspects, artists will escape liability until courts become cognizant 
of the commercially evolving market for art.260 Unless courts do that, 
the noncommercial use exception will pose a problem and should ei-
ther be eliminated from the TDRA as an affirmative defense or used as a 
factor in a fair use balancing test.261 By retaining noncommercial use as 
an affirmative defense, Congress has predetermined that the expressive 
value of a work containing some commercial aspects always outweighs 
the risk of commercial harm.262 This predetermination is not only pre-
mature in light of the fuzzy line between commercial and noncommer-
cial uses, but an outlier in the field of intellectual property.263 
                                                                                                                     
D. The Parody and Nominative Fair Use Deficiency 
 Not only is the noncommercial use exception unnecessarily block-
ing mark holders from protection, but the addition of parody as an af-
firmative defense also renders the noncommercial use defense redun-
dant in the context of expressive works.264 Under the FTDA, there was 
no parody exception so courts used the noncommercial use exception 
as a tool to protect parodies from liability.265 Although parody is its own 
exception today, courts still use the noncommercial use exception to 
protect parodies.266 But parody’s possession of its own affirmative de-
 
260 See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publ’g, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1531, 1537−38 (D. Me. 1986) 
rev’d sub nom. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding 
that plaintiff’s trademark is in the nature of a property right and does not need to yield to 
First Amendment rights, and that if injunctive relief were not available to prevent dilution 
of a trademark, then any unauthorized use of a mark would be without remedy). The orig-
inal 2005 bill did not contain the noncommercial use exception. H.R. Rep. No. 109-23, at 
2. Instead, the draft bill contained a parody exception, and a representative stated that it 
adequately managed to balance the rights of trademark holders and the First Amendment. 
See 151 Cong. Rec. 2123 (2005); Lockridge, supra note 13, at 350 (noting that although 
the bill did not have a noncommercial use exception, it had an exclusion for parodying, 
criticizing, or commenting upon the mark). Advocates of the bill containing only the par-
ody exception believed the noncommercial use exception was precarious in its calling for 
courts to distinguish commercial and noncommercial speech. See Joern, supra note 6, at 
293. 
261 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 308; Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804. 
262 See Lockridge, supra note 13, at 369. 
263 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 308; Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989); 
Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804. 
264 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006); Joern, supra note 6, at 293–95. 
265 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006); Walk-
ing Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812. 
266 See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339−40. 
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fense renders continued judicial reliance on the noncommercial use 
exception both unnecessary and unfair to mark holders.267 
 An additional implication of the parody exclusion arises from the 
unclear interpretation of parody resulting in an unfair benefit to de-
fendants over mark holders.268 Courts have varied in their interpreta-
tions of parody, allowing artists to grasp onto the defense even if their 
work does not specifically parody the famous mark.269 The inclusion of 
parody under the fair use umbrella provides blanket coverage to art-
ists.270 Now that parody is a separate affirmative defense to dilution 
claims, courts must consistently apply the defense.271 Too broad an in-
terpretation of parody will allow any artist to “cry parody” at the mark 
holder’s expense.272 First, courts must understand that according to the 
text of the TDRA, use of a mark as a source identifier should preclude 
parody as fair use.273 Secondly, unsure of whether the mark must be the 
target or weapon of the parody, courts may find for defendants who 
used famous marks as weapons of the parody.274 Examining the statutory 
language itself and relevant case law, it seems as though courts should 
only apply the parody exemption when the mark is used as a target, not 
                                                                                                                      
267 See id. (using the noncommercial use defense only to justify parody as a defense); 
TDRA Hearing, supra note 88, at 36–37 (statement of Mr. Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative 
Counsel, ACLU) (noting that courts used the noncommercial use defense to protect par-
odies from liability, and thus recommending that the TDRA drop the noncommercial and 
commercial distinction if adopting a free speech defense such as parody). 
268 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3); infra notes 269−277 and accompanying text. 
269 See Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 801−02, 812 (holding that Barbie photo-
graphs, which commented upon gender roles and women’s position in society, were paro-
dies of Barbie); Gunnell, supra note 31, at 467−68. But see Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 
(holding that defendant’s Wal-Ocaust and Wal-Qaeda logos commented directly upon Wal-
Mart and were thus successful parodies). 
270 See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (defining parody as a simple form of entertain-
ment conveyed by the juxtaposition of the representation of the mark with the idealized 
image created by the mark’s owner); Gunnell, supra note 31, at 463, 465 (noting the effect 
of such a broad parody exception and the lack of attention courts give to defining a par-
ody in dilution cases). 
271 See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339−40 (using parody as part of the noncommercial 
use exception but neglecting to recognize that the defendant was using marks to refer to 
his own products). But see Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 112 (recognizing that the parody 
exception will not apply because defendant was using “Charbucks” as a designation of 
source for its own goods). 
272 See Gunnell, supra note 31, at 471 (quoting 6 McCarthy, supra note 15, § 31:153). 
273 See Starbucks Corp., 588 F.3d at 112. The TDRA makes it clear that the defense will 
not apply if the mark is used as the designation of source for the defendant’s own goods or 
services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
274 See Gunnell, supra note 31, at 468−69; Posner, supra note 125, at 67−68. 
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a weapon.275 As presently constituted, courts applying the TDRA may 
allow a parodist to use the holder’s mark in a fashion harmful to the 
mark simply because the parodist is satirizing or commenting upon so-
ciety, rather than the mark itself.276 Thus, artists may “escape[] judicial 
scrutiny” regardless of whether the use is actually a parody or the de-
gree to which the mark is harmed.277 Max Papeschi, under the current 
judicial interpretation of parody under the TDRA, could successfully 
raise the parody defense.278 Although he does not use Disney as the 
“target” of his parody, courts would likely exempt his use of the Disney 
trademark as a parody, reasoning that Papeschi has differentiated his 
parody from the original mark and is using the mark as a satire to criti-
cize American culture at large.279 
 Papeschi would also be able to escape liability under the nomina-
tive fair use defense because he used Mickey Mouse to reference the 
Disney brand.280 An artistic use of a mark is inherently nominative, as 
the depiction identifies the mark holder’s trademark.281 This guaran-
teed exclusion for artists, however, has no grounding in the dilution by 
tarnishment context.282 Nominative use is considered fair use in trade-
mark infringement because it does not attempt to capitalize on con-
                                                                                                                      
275 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (requiring the parody be commenting upon the famous 
mark); Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1340; Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 
F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1997) (reasoning that the similarity between Dr. Seuss’s style and 
the parody was not warranted where the authors were not intending to actually comment 
on Dr. Seuss); Posner, supra note 125, at 71; see also Gunnell, supra note 31, at 468 (noting 
that weapon parodies provide little societal benefit because they could have conveyed their 
message without negatively affecting the intellectual property of the mark holder). 
276 Gunnell, supra note 31, at 466−69 (discussing whether courts may interpret the 
statute to find that some parodies do not constitute fair use or perhaps apply an imprecise 
definition of parody to more generally benefit defendants). 
277 See id. at 442, 467−68. The juxtaposition of dilution and parody have been coined 
the “dilution-parody paradox.” Id. at 454. Underlying this paradox is the tension between 
parody and dilution due to the fact that the ridicule that is the object of parody conflicts 
with the purpose of anti-dilution law. Id. 
278 See Smith 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316; supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text. 
279 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th 
Cir. 2007); Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316; Gunnell, supra note 31, at 468; Posner, supra 
note 125, at 71. 
280 See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 112; Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d at 812. The nomina-
tive fair use defense is unnecessary due to the requirement that the use be a trademark 
use. See Burstein, supra note 7, at 1225, 1244. If the junior user must use the mark as a 
trademark in order to fall within the scope of the statute, then the nominative fair use 
exception (which exempts non-trademark uses) is irrelevant. See id. 
281 See Playboy Enters., Inc., v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002); New Kids on 
the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). 
282 See infra notes 283−286 and accompanying text. 
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sumer confusion.283 This kind of trademark use is now an affirmative 
defense for dilution by tarnishment, yet consumer confusion is by no 
means a part of tarnishment theory.284 By creating a cause of action for 
dilution by tarnishment, Congress sought to remedy any use that en-
croaches upon the business reputation of a famous mark, not to remedy 
public confusion caused by competitors’ use of that mark.285 If tarnish-
ment is still a result of the defendant’s use, then a nominative use that 
developed out of concern for consumer confusion should not have any 
bearing on a court’s judgment.286 
V. Recommendations for Improving the TDRA 
 As the TDRA will immediately shield defendants when applied to 
artistic works, courts should not use it in such situations.287 Other areas 
of intellectual property law more appropriately balance the property 
rights of plaintiffs with the First Amendment concerns of defen-
dants.288 This Part suggests that a more accurate analysis of trademark 
dilution by tarnishment can come from a comparative look at the 
methods used by courts in actions based on copyright law and the right 
of publicity.289 This Part first proposes an alternative to the rigid frame-
work of the TDRA: an alteration to the language in the cause of action 
for injunctive relief and a new fair use defense, similar to that of copy-
right law, as a substitute for the TDRA’s statutory defenses.290 This Part 
                                                                                                                      
283 See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. 
284 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006). In addition, a broad nominative fair use defense is 
unnecessary given the existence of the fair use exclusion for use of a mark in advertising 
or promotion that allows consumers to compare goods. See id. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i); see also 
New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (noting that the nominative fair use defense is per-
missible because the junior user uses the mark in a non-confusing way to identify the mark 
holder’s goods). 
285 See Eastman Kodak Co., 739 F. Supp. at 118–19. 
286See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 903; New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308. Also, there is 
no uniform understanding of how the nominative fair use test will be applied. See Burstein 
supra note 7, at 1242–44. 
287 See Rosenblatt, supra note 14, at 1011 (noting that trademark law permits negative 
depictions of marks); supra notes 202−286 and accompanying text. 
288 See E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 
2008) (applying the artistic relevance test in a trademark infringement case); Rogers v. 
Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (using a four-factor fair use test in a copyright 
case); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807−08 (Cal. 2001) (ap-
plying a balancing test in a right of publicity case that draws upon the fair use text in copy-
right law); supra notes 139−201 and accompanying text. 
289 See infra notes 292−322 and accompanying text. 
290 See infra notes 292−322 and accompanying text. 
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then returns to Papeschi and examines how Disney would likely suc-
ceed in obtaining an injunction under the proposed solution.291 
                                                                                                                     
A. Multifactorial Fair Use Defense 
 The adoption of a fair use defense similar to that found in copy-
right law is one way to solve some of the TDRA’s deficiencies.292 If the 
use is deemed tarnishing, then the artist could raise a multifactorial fair 
use defense in place of the current noncommercial use and nomina-
tive/parody fair use exclusions.293 
 Before discussing the adoption of a fair use defense similar to cop-
yright law, the problematic trademark use requirement and the nation-
ally famous mark requirement must be addressed.294 To allow the 
TDRA to capture non-trademark uses, injunctive relief for tarnishing 
uses should apply to any “use of an image of, or similar to, a famous 
mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by 
blurring or tarnishment of the famous mark.”295 Then, to allow owners 
of marks that are only famous in niche markets to have a claim against 
a diluter, the FTDA’s broader famous mark requirement should be re-
adopted.296 
 To address the complications with the noncommercial use and 
nominative fair use/parody defenses, a balancing test based on the fair 
use test of copyright law should replace the noncommercial use and 
broad fair use exclusions—except for the fair use exclusion allowing 
advertising or promotion permitting consumers to compare goods.297 
In place of the over-encompassing fair use defense and separate de-
 
291 See infra notes 323−338 and accompanying text. 
292 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 309. 
293 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2006); Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. 
294 See supra notes 217−247 and accompanying text. 
295 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); supra notes 217–232 and accompanying text. The 
TDRA’s definition of tarnishment would similarly be altered to read: “An association aris-
ing from the similarity between an image of a famous mark and the famous mark itself that 
harms the reputation of the mark.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
296 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); 
supra notes 76–87, 233–247 and accompanying text. 
297 See infra notes 298−322 and accompanying text. The Copyright Act states that copy-
ing for purposes such as criticism or comment may constitute “fair use” subject to a four-
factor test. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. The fair use exclusion for 
advertising and promotion that will remain in the proposed standard should be structured 
as it was under the FTDA.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A) (2000), amended by 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (“Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative 
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the 
owner of the famous mark.”). 
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fense for noncommercial use, the TDRA should adopt copyright’s first 
fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use, to determine 
whether or not the tarnishing use was fair.298 Doing so would allow 
courts to examine noncommercial use as one factor that may constitute 
fair use, while also providing a clearer and more consistent definition 
of parody and removing trademark infringement’s confusion-based 
nominative fair use defense.299 
 Analyzing noncommercial use as just one factor in determining 
fair use is preferable to the present defense because “any noncommer-
cial use” is too broad to stand alone as a defense in an art world that is 
increasingly commercial, and it is duplicative given the existence of a 
parody exemption.300 In right of publicity and copyright infringement 
cases, an expressive work with some commercial elements is not imme-
diately excluded from liability as it is in dilution by tarnishment.301 
Noncommercial use is instead considered when balancing competing 
interests.302 Trademark dilution stands alone in refusing to perform a 
similar balancing of interests.303 Rather than automatically exclude ex-
pressive works from liability because they do more than propose a 
                                                                                                                      
298 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. Under this factor, courts analyze noncom-
mercial use and parody. Koons, 960 F.2d at 309. The exception for news reporting and news 
commentary should remain an explicit affirmative defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(B). 
299 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 309; infra notes 300–322 and accompanying text. Under this 
fair use test, a trademark use will usually not be protected as a fair use because most dilut-
ers who use a representation of a famous mark as their own trademark are doing so for 
commercial purposes in selling their products. See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough 
Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (describing how the “Charbucks” marks were 
used as a designation of source for the defendant’s coffee products). This result is consis-
tent with the TDRA’s language implying that trademark uses are especially unworthy of fair 
use protection. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (excluding from fair use the use of a mark as 
a designation of source for the junior user’s goods or services). 
300 See Lockridge, supra note 13, at 355 (discussing the complicated line drawing in the 
context of the noncommercial use exclusion); see also Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. 
Supp. 2d 1302, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (finding defendant’s domain names and website 
merchandise analogizing Wal-Mart to Nazis and al-Qaeda were parodic works considered 
noncommercial speech). But see Joern, supra note 6, at 294−97 (citing support for the in-
clusion of both a noncommercial and parody exception); supra notes 248−267 and accom-
panying text. 
301 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 308; Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804. 
302 See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 925 (6th Cir. 2003) (balancing 
First Amendment rights with intellectual property rights despite the use being noncom-
mercial); Koons, 960 F.2d at 309 (noting that the noncommercial aspect of Koons’s artwork 
is but one part of the first factor of the four-factor test); Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804, 
808 (using a “transformative” test despite having determined the work is noncommercial). 
303 See Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1340; Lockridge, supra note 13, at 368−69 (discussing 
how Congress does its own balancing by giving defendants a general noncommercial use 
exclusion). 
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commercial transaction, tarnishment law should draw from the copy-
right context and allow noncommercial use to function as a factor in 
considering whether purpose and character of the use is fair.304 
 When analyzing noncommercial use in a multifactorial dilution 
test, the court should look to the doctrines of copyright and the right of 
publicity because both are more flexible regarding the boundary be-
tween commercial and noncommercial use.305 For the right of public-
ity, the high degree of First Amendment protection for noncommercial 
speech about celebrities will not necessarily outweigh an individual’s 
right to publicity.306 In the copyright context, the court has explained 
that the “crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the 
sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”307 Unlike dilution by tarnishment, therefore, copy-
right law does not monitor the commercial/noncommercial boundary 
by looking at the primary purpose.308 Instead, copyright law focuses on 
whether the user will profit from exploiting the copyrighted material, 
and considers this determination as one factor in its fair use decision.309 
 Under this purpose and use factor, courts must clarify their inter-
pretation for what constitutes a parody.310 Parody has not always been 
consistently interpreted and the TDRA does not define parody.311 In-
stead, parody for trademark purposes has been judicially defined as a 
form of entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the representation of 
the trademark with the “idealized image created by the mark’s own-
er.”312 A parody must also express some element of satire, ridicule, jok-
ing, or amusement.313 This judicial definition of parody leaves much 
                                                                                                                      
304 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 309; see also Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808 (looking to copy-
right law in applying its own transformative test). 
305 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 309; Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804. 
306 See Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 804. 
307 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 309 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)). The Court also quoted a New York Times critic who complained, 
“Koons is pushing the relationship between art and money so far that everyone involved 
comes out looking slightly absurd.” See id. at 304. 
308 See id. at 309. 
309 See id. 
310 See Gunnell, supra note 31, at 454 (writing that there is a strong tension between di-
lution and parody); infra notes 311−317 and accompanying text. 
311 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 
792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 
2002); Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. 
312 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th 
Cir. 2007). 
313 See id. 
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leeway for artists to claim exemption from liability.314 Although there 
are slight variants to this definition, each should culminate in a consis-
tent, appropriate legal standard.315 One scholar proposes to define 
“parody” as “a (1) literary or artistic work (2) that seeks to comment 
upon or criticize another work (3) by appropriating or mimicking ele-
ments of the original work, in order to (4) create a new artwork that 
makes ridiculous the style and expression of the original (5) in a hu-
morous fashion.”316 This definition could guide courts to reach consis-
tent decisions of whether an artist’s work is truly a parody.317 
 Part of the courts’ inconsistent application of the parody defense 
stems from confusion over whether the target/weapon distinction is 
relevant in dilution cases.318 The statute can be read as implying that 
some parodies do not constitute fair use, specifically those that do not 
target the original mark.319 If exclusion from liability was solely based 
on an artist claiming parody without determining whether the artist 
was actually commenting upon the mark itself, then there would be 
no concrete boundary to the fair use defense.320 Courts in the dilu-
tion context should analyze parodies with reference to their role as a 
target or weapon, and apply the parody exemption when the mark is 
used as a target.321 Adopting the copyright understanding of parody— 
                                                                                                                      
314 See Gunnell, supra note 31, at 471. 
315 See id. at 454 (writing that a universal requirement of parody is that it must convey 
two messages—that it is the original but also that it is not the original and is instead a par-
ody). Compare Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260 (using the juxtaposition definition), and 
Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (same), with MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 901 (looking at the 
target/weapon distinction for infringement). 
316 See Gunnell, supra note 31, at 466. 
317 See id. This parody definition would also exclude trademark uses from the fair use 
defense because the definition only applies to literary or artistic works. See id. This result is 
consistent with the TDRA’s fair use defense which excludes trademark uses. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006). 
318 See Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d at 260; MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 901; Burstein, supra 
note 7, at 1211−12. 
319 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (requiring the parody be commenting upon the famous 
mark); Gunnell, supra note 31, at 466; Posner, supra note 125, at 74 (discussing parodies in 
the copyright context but analogizing them to parodies in the dilution context due to their 
similar approach of analyzing economic consequences and not looking at source of confu-
sion as an issue). Also, the statute already recognizes that where the parody is used as a 
source identifier, it is not fair use. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
320 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310; Gunnell, supra note 31, at 468. 
321 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (requiring the parody be commenting upon the 
famous mark); MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 901; Posner, supra note 125, at 71; see also Gunnell, 
supra note 31, at 468 (noting that weapon parodies provide little societal benefit because 
they could have conveyed their message without negatively affecting the intellectual prop-
erty of the mark holder). 
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in which the copied work must be an object of the parody—would 
serve this end.322 
B. Reexamining “NaziSexyMouse” Under the Proposed Solution 
 Under the proposed solution, Disney would likely succeed in a di-
lution by tarnishment suit against Papeschi.323 First, it is important to 
understand how “NaziSexyMouse” tarnishes the Disney mark and why 
Papeschi should be liable for such tarnishment.324 Courts have found 
dilution by tarnishment in cases involving adult cartoons, illegal drugs, 
crude humor, and X-rated movies.325 In 2008, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Georgia in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. recognized 
dilution by tarnishment in situations where the trademark is portrayed 
in an “unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering 
thoughts about the owner’s product.”326 It is clear from past cases that 
Papeschi’s use of the Disney mark, a positive brand name, in the un-
wholesome context of a nude woman and a swastika would be suffi-
ciently tarnishing.327 
 Despite the tarnishment, some may urge that Papeschi is nonethe-
less deserving of First Amendment protection.328 This Note does not 
argue that all tarnishing uses are not deserving of protection.329 But it 
does argue that before presuming all artistic works deserve protection, 
                                                                                                                      
322 See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310. Some courts seem to have reached an understanding that 
the parody must target the original mark. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 901 (holding so in 
the infringement context); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 
604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 
688 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
323 See infra notes 331−338 and accompanying text. 
324 See infra notes 325−330 and accompanying text. 
325 See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206; Eastman Kodak Co. v. D.B. Rakow, 
739 F. Supp. 116, 118 (W.D.N.Y. 1989); Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing 
Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1032, 1036, 1040 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
326 See 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. 
327 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2006); Smith, 537 F. Supp. 2d at 1339; Gunnell, supra 
note 31, at 462 (noting that courts are displeased when a trademark is associated with 
“lewd, rude, and unsavory characteristics” for purely commercial purposes although they 
are willing to provide some slack when there is some societal message). Courts have found 
tarnishment to occur in contexts such as those involving illicit drugs or lewd or sexual 
behavior. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387–88 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The 
. . . ‘association’ between a famous mark and lewd or bawdy sexual activity disparages and 
defiles the famous mark and reduces the commercial value of its selling power.”), rev’d, 537 
U.S. 418 (2003); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 
1972). 
328 See Roe, supra note 13, at 604–05 (noting the discomfort some scholars have with 
trademark dilution). 
329 See supra notes 202−216 and accompanying text. 
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the rights of mark holders should be more fairly balanced with the 
rights of artists.330 
 Papeschi’s work would not be shielded under the reworked 
TDRA.331 Although the exclusions of news reporting and advertising to 
compare goods and services remain, Papeschi’s work clearly does not 
fit into either category.332 Thus the court would have to analyze the 
work under the multifactorial fair use defense where the noncommer-
cial nature of “NaziSexyMouse” would be but one factor among many 
to determine fair use.333 If a court were to recognize Papeschi’s large 
poster advertising his work and the fading line between commercial 
and noncommercial works in the commercial art market, then the 
purpose/use factor would likely weigh in favor of Disney.334 Regarding 
the parodic nature of the work, the court would examine “NaziSexy-
Mouse” under the “parody as target” analysis.335 Papeschi explains on 
his website that the series is a commentary on the United States, reveal-
ing all the “horrors of the American lifestyle.”336 The use of the Mickey 
Mouse head, therefore, is not the target of the parody, but rather a 
weapon to comment on the United States.337 Without Disney serving as 
the target of the parody, the parody fair use defense would also tilt to 
the mark holder’s favor.338 
Conclusion 
 Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, the property rights of 
the mark holder are not balanced with the free speech rights of artists. 
Under the current statutory framework, if a mark holder seeks injunc-
tive relief for an artist’s tarnishing use, he will fail every time. Not only 
does the language of the statute make it inapplicable to expressive 
works, but the extensive statutory defenses overcompensate for the 
small benefits the TDRA gives to mark holders. Other areas of intellec-
tual property reveal that there are more adequate ways to balance these 
rights. Courts may use a fair use balancing test rather than apply the 
rigid defenses to artistic works. Either way, this Note urges Congress to 
                                                                                                                      
330 See Rosenblatt, supra note 14, at 1011. 
331 See supra notes 292−322 and accompanying text. 
332 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). 
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recognize the inapplicability of the TDRA to expressive works and sug-
gests drawing from other areas of intellectual property law to better 
understand the appropriate balance of property rights of mark holders 
with the First Amendment concerns of free speech and public expres-
sion. 
Alexandra E. Olson 
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Appendix: Poster of “NaziSexyMouse” by Max Papeschi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kirsten Grieshaber, Mickey Mouse with Nazi Symbol Causes Anger in Poland, Huffington 
Post ( July 14, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/14/mickey-mouse-with-nazi-
sy_n_645721.html 
